





This is the story of two cases involving two babies, four biological
parents, one foster parent, and six grandparents.' Many parallels
can be found in the lives of the babies and their families. "Few paral-
lels can be found, however, in the ways that courts addressed their
lives.
Both babies were the subject of adoption actions. 2 When the ba-
bies were born, their parents were young, unmarried, and depen-
dent on older people.3 Both babies spent a substantial amount of
time in the care of single women.4 Their grandparents had hopes
and plans for both their children and their grandchildren.
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1. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (involving one baby,
Michael; two biological parents, Debra Skeens and Jeffrey Paterno; maternal grandparents,
the Skeens; and paternal grandparents, the Paternos), cerl. denied, 484 A.2d 274 (Md. 1984); In
re Baby Girl D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 73-75 (D.C. 1991) [hereinafter In re D.S.] (involving one baby,
D.S.; one biological parent, T.S.; one foster parent, V.V.; and maternal grandparents, the E.s).
2. Sheens, 480 A.2d at 822 (noting thatJeffrey Paterno sued Debra Skeens and her par-
ents to enjoin them from engaging in any suit relative to the child's adoption, but later, all
adoption issues were discarded); In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 73 (stating that both the foster parent
and maternal grandparents sought to adopt the baby).
3. Sheens, 480 A.2d at 822 (discussing the fact that Debra Skeens was an unmarried
minor when her child was born); In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74, 76 (involving T.:, a fifteen year
old, who decided to stay with a friend of the family, V.V., who became the foster parent to
both T.S. and her child, D.S.).
4. Sheens, 480 A.2d at 822 (awarding custody of the child to the unmarried mother,
Debra); In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74 (noting that the child had remained in the custody of the
foster mother, V.V., since her birth). V.V. testified that she lived with her twenty-three year
old daughter, implying that she was a single mother. Id. at 78.
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The court in each case discussed the roles of grandparents in the
lives of babies born to young parents. And there the parallels in the
lives of these families end.5 In one case, the court upheld an order
granting the paternal grandparents substantial visitation rights with
the child, who was in the custody of his mother.6 In the other case,
the appellate court found the willingness of the maternal grandpar-
ents to adopt and raise the child irrelevant to its decision about
whether to terminate the mother's parental rights.
7
This article will first explore why the relationships of the grand-
parents, parents, and children were given such disparate treatment
despite similar circumstances. My theory is that the trial and appel-
late courts were influenced by the sex, gender roles, class, and, to
the degree the factor can be viewed, the race of the parents, foster
parent, and grandparents. I will then address outcomes that might
have been possible had the judges been less influenced by these fac-
tors in their decisions. Although my argument is less with the out-
comes of these cases than with their analyses, I also believe that
eliminating or reducing biased forms of analysis could lead to differ-
ent results in similar cases.
I want to emphasize that the nature of my inquiry is to uncover
operative ideologies associated with gender, race, and class, and not
to accuse judges of being sexist, racist, or classist. In my view, how
we think about families is profoundly influenced by how we think
families should be; the ideals or norms of society have a profound
influence on what conclusions we draw.
Although I think one's perspective is important in any type of law-
making or judging, I think the perspectives we bring to family issues
may be among the most influential, as well as the most obscured.
Because we grow up in families, and because they seem so "natural"
or preordained, we may go through life without giving much
thought to the social constructions of families. When we have an
opportunity to make law about families-as judges, legislators, and
lawyers-we may never go back to ask the fundamental question,
5. The cases are different because the court in Skeens upheld grandparental visitation
rights while the court in In re D.S. found that grandparental rights could not be considered in
an action to terminate a parent's rights. See Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 827 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984) (holding that the trial court had the power to award visitation rights to the
child's paternal grandparents to be exercised when the father was away on naval duty); In re
D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 85 (D.C. 1991) (holding that the trial court erred in withholding termina-
tion, in part, on the assumption that grandparents' rights would be impermissibly affected).
6. See Sheens, 480 A.2d at 827 (upholding the court order granting the paternal grand-
parents the right to exercise the father's visitation rights in the father's absence).
7. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 84 (finding that the termination statute expressly limits the
effects of a termination hearing to the parent specified and that it has no effect on whatever
legal rights the grandparents may have in the child's future).
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"Why do we think people ought to act a certain way in family set-
tings?" Similarly, many of our notions about gender, race, and class
are embedded early in our socialization.8 These beliefs often seem
"natural" and preordained. It follows, therefore, that one's views of
what is natural and right for families may well be influenced by what
one thinks is natural and right about gender relations, people of a
particular race, or the effect of having or lacking economic
resources.
Gender, race, and class ideologies concerning parents and chil-
dren have been discovered and debated often in legal circles.9 In
this article, I will be adding an additional layer of factual complexity:
What role does ideological thinking about race, gender, and class
play in judicial interventions when the decision also involves a third
generation? Given the increasing importance of grandparents as
caretakers for children 10 and the growing intensity of the fight some
grandparents are waging for visitation rights with grandchildren,"1
8. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DxFFRNT VOICE 7 (1982) (discussing Robert
Stoller's studies which indicate that gender identity in most cases is firmly established by the
age of three);Janet W. Schofield, An Exploratory Study of the Draw-A-Person As a Measure of Radal
Identity, 46 PRCEPMAL AND MOTOR SILLS 311,320 (1978) (concluding that having white and
African-American first and second graders "draw a person" was a valid method of measuring
acceptance of racial identity); NANCY CHODOROW, Family Structure and Feminine Personality, in
Wor.AN, CULTuRE, AND SociETY 43, 49 (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds., 1974) (stating that
cognitive psychologists have established that by the age of three, boys and girls have an irre-
versible conception of their gender); JuANrrA H. WILIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: BEmAv-
IOR IN A BxsocAL CoNTrT 108 (1977) (noting that gender identity is imprinted during a
critical period between eighteen months and three years).
9. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 797, 823 (1989)
(discussing a gender system that results in the impoverishment of women, since it leads
mothers to systematically "choose" against performing as ideal workers in order to ensure
that their children receive quality care); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draflees: The Struggle
for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1451-57 (discussing the relationship between
gender ideologies and unequal labor allocations at work and at home for parents and chil-
dren); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L RET'. 235, 237-39 (1982) (advocating the use of the standard
of "primary caretaker" rather than economic resources in determining the "best interest of
the child" in custody awards); ARLIE HoCHSCH LD, THE SECOND SmF, 15-21 (1989) (discuss-
ing the development of gender ideologies in husbands and wives and how these ideologies
affect the notion of family); Rivera V. Marcus, The Due Process Rights of Foster Parents, 50 BROOx.
L. Rav. 483, 488 (1984) (noting cases where courts considered the race of the parent in the
adoption action and the practice did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
10. See Jean Seligmann, Variations on a Theme: Skip-generation Parents, NEwswEEx, Winter
1989-Spring 1990 Special Ed., at 46 (explaining the importance of the skip-parent generation
phenomenon, where grandparents take care of their grandchildren when parents either be-
come unable to fulfill their duty or refuse to be responsible for their children).
11. See Katherine Ames et al., Grandma Goes to Court, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 67 (not-
ing that twelve states now permit grandparents to petition the court for visitation rights with-
out the prerequisite of death or divorce of a parent); Jody George, Children and Grandparents:
The Right to rUit, CHILDREN TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 14, 14-15 (discussing the fact that since
1965, every state has enacted a visitation rights statute which allows grandparents the right to
petition the court for visitation rights).
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exploring the impact of gender, race, and class ideologies on three-
generational families is timely.
II. THE CASES
A. Skeens v. Paterno
In Skeens v. Paterno,12 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
granted visitation to the biological father's parents.13
Skeens was decided twice by the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals. The case began with the birth of Michael in January of
1983.14 Michael's mother, Debra, was an unmarried seventeen year
old at the time of his birth.' 5 She and her parents, the Skeens,
planned to place the baby at birth with a couple who wished to
adopt him. 16 Before the delivery, Michael's father, Jeffrey, learned
of the adoption plans and objected. 17 Jeffrey was in the Navy and
did not seek to care for the child himself.' s Instead, he proposed
placing the child with his sister and her husband, or with his par-
ents. 19 Three days after Michael's birth, Jeffrey sued Debra and her
parents, seeking custody and an injunction to prohibit placing
Michael with the proposed adoptive parents.20 Temporary custody
was awarded to Jeffrey's sister and her husband after a hearing at
which Debra was not permitted to testify.2 1 Her attorney proffered
that Debra would care for the baby herself if the adoption were not
allowed. 22 In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
12. No. 94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983), appeal after remand, 480 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App.), cert. denied, 484 A.2d 274 (Md. 1984).
13. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id at 822 (noting that the Skeens had arranged to place the child with Bruce and
Bonnie Gordon).
17. See id at 822 (noting thatJeffrey Paterno filed suit to enjoin the adoption proceed-
ings three days after Michael's birth). The court in Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at I
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983), stated thatJeffrey Paterno objected to the Skeen's adop-
tion plans before Michael's birth.
18. See Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at I (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983) (stating
that Jeffrey preferred that the child be placed in his custody with the understanding that his
sister and her husband, CynthiaJo and Patrick Clayton Ortman, or alternatively, his parents,
the Paternos, would care for the child).
19. Id.
20. See Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting that
Jeffrey sued Debra and her parents to enjoin them from participating in any adoption pro.
ceedings involving the child).
21. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983) (award.
ing temporary custody of Michael to the Ortmans, Jeffrey Paterno's sister and her husband,
and finding Debra's testimony regarding her desire to keep Michael inadmissible).
22. Id. at 4.
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reversed the award of custody to a nonparent over the objection of
the mother where the mother had not been allowed to testify.
28
During subsequent proceedings, Debra gave up her plan to have
Michael adopted.24 After another hearing, she was awarded cus-
tody.25 Jeffrey continued his career in the Navy, which required him
occasionally to be away from home.26 The court awarded Jeffrey
substantial visitation rights, including at least two consecutive days
and nights a week, every other major holiday, and six consecutive
weeks during the summer.27 DuringJeffrey's absences, his parents,
the Paternos, were empowered to exercise Jeffrey's visitation
rights.2
8
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the visitation or-
der.29 After finding that a court of equity has the power to award
grandparental visitation when it is in the best interests of the child
to do so, the Court decided that the visitation order was necessary
to nurture the' relationship between Michael and his paternal rela-
tives.8 0 According to the Court, grandparental visitation was to be
"an important way for [Jeffrey] to maintain contact with the child-
and for the child to maintain contact with the paternal side of his
family .... "31
B. In re D.S.
In In re D.S.,32 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
concluded that the willingness of the maternal grandparents to
adopt the child was not to be considered when deciding whether to
terminate the mother's parental rights 33
23. Id. at 6 ("We can perceive of no situation in which it would be proper to remove
custody of a child from its natural mother over the mother's objection without permitting the
mother to testify as to her position on the matter.").
24. See Skeens, 480 A.2d at 822 (stating that the adoption issue disappeared from the case
during the course of subsequent judicial activity).
25. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
26. Id. at 822-23.
27. Id? at 823.
28. See id. (noting that the Paternos could exerciseJefrey's visitation rights when he was
away working for the Navy, including taking the child to their residence and having physical
custody of the child).
29. Sheens, 480 A.2d at 827 (holding that the court had the power to award visitation
rights to the grandparents and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so).
30. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 827 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (holding that a
court has the power to decide visitation rights by grandparents using the best interest of the
child standard). The court stated that "there is ample evidence that the child should have
contact with its father and its father's family, and that the elder Paternos are in every respect
fit grandparents." Id
31. Ird
32. 600 A.2d 71 (D.C. 1991).
33. Id.
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The child, D.S., was born to T.S. when she was fifteen years old
and unmarried.3 4 The biological father appeared to have taken no
interest in the child.35 At the time she gave birth, T.S. lived with a
foster parent, V.V., because T.S. had a conflicted relationship with
her mother and stepfather, the E.s. 36 T.S. had been adjudicated ne-
glected.3 7 T.S. appeared to have no interest in caring for the baby
herself at the time of its birth.38 The E.s were asked whether they
would take the baby from the hospital, but they declined because
T.S. would not care for the baby with them.3 9 T.S. was charged with
neglect of D.S., and she consented to a finding of neglect.40 D.S.
was placed with a foster parent, V.V.41 The E.s regularly visited
D.S.4 2 T.S. rarely saw or inquired about D.S.
4 3
When D.S. was nearly two years old, V.V. petitioned to adopt
her.44 The guardian ad litem for D.S. filed a petition to terminate
T.S.'sr parental rights. 45 V.V., already a party in the neglect pro-
ceeding, sought and was granted leave to intervene in the termina-
tion action.46 The termination motion was the first of the
proceedings to be heard.47 T.S. twice moved to consolidate the
34. In re D.S, 600 A.2d 71, 74 & n.2 (D.C. 1991) (discussing the fact that T.S. was fifteen
when she gave birth to D.S. and that there was a putative father named in the neglect petition
implying that the parents did not marry).
35. See id at 74 n.2 (stating that the role of the putative father in the proceeding was
unclear because the record did not indicate whether the putative father's rights had been
adjudicated, even though counsel had been appointed for him).
36. See id at 74, 77 (noting that the mother, T.S., returned to V.V.'s home after the
child's birth because "'she said she could not get along with her mother' and her stepfather
'would physically discipline her.' ") (quoting T.S.).
37. See id. at 74 (conveying that T.S. was adjudicated a neglected child in 1985).
38. See id. (noting that T.S. left the child with V.V. soon after the child's birth and V.V.
remained the uninterrupted custodian for the child, D.S.).
39. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 79 (D.C. 1991) (stating that Mrs. E. did not want to take
the baby alone because she wanted T.S. to establish a bond with the child).
40. lId at 74 (noting that the trial court, in accordance with a stipulation signed by T.S.,
found D.S. to be a neglected child within the meaning of D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-2301 (9)(B)-
(C)(1989)).
41. Id (stating that because V.V. was already acting as T.S.'s foster parent, she was ap-
pointed onJuly 17, 1986, to take care of D.S. as well).
42. See id at 75 n.5 (discussing that in June 1987, the court permitted the E.s to have
frequent visitation with the child, but that in 1989, the visits were limited to the social
worker's office).
43. See id at 78 (noting that T.S. visited the child only six times before the November
1989 termination hearing, and that when T.S. occasionally saw V.V. on the street, she did not
inquire about D.S. or express interest in visiting her).
44. In re D.S, 600 A.2d 71, 74 (D.C. 1991) (stating that in February 1988, V.V. filed a
petition to adopt D.S., who was nineteen months old at the time).
45. Id. (noting that in December 1988, when D.S. was twenty-nine months old, her
guardian ad litem filed a motion to terminate T.S.'s parental rights).
46. See id. at 76 (discussing that on July 13, 1989, V.V., already a party to the neglect
action, filed a motion to be joined as a party to the termination proceeding pursuant to D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2356 (1989), and that one month later the court granted the motion).
47. See id at 73, 76 (stating that the termination hearing was held on November 24, 1989,
while the adoption action was pending).
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neglect/termination proceeding with V.V.'s adoption petition, but
the motion was denied on both occasions. 48 Before the motion was
heard the second time, the E.s petitioned to adopt D.S., and T.S.
consented in writing to have the E.s adopt D.S.49 Although the E.s
were not parties to the termination proceeding, and although the
termination proceeding was not consolidated with the competing
petitions to adopt D.S., the central question at the termination hear-
ing was whether the E.s should have an ongoing relationship with
D.S.5 O
1. The Trial Court's Holding
After hearing the testimony of V.V., the E.s, several social work-
ers, and mental health providers, the trial court concluded that D.S.
would suffer harm if the parental rights of T.S. were terminated,
because of the "irrevocable dismissal of the chance for [D.S.] to
know her birth family." 5' According to the trial court, the statute
failed to address the role of grandmothers in families with juvenile
mothers in the District of Columbia.52 The trial court argued that
48. Counsel for T.S. moved on February 9, 1989, to consolidate D.S.'s neglect/termina-
tion proceeding with V.V.'s adoption proceeding. The motion was denied. In re D.S., 600
A.2d at 75. On June 5, 1989, counsel for T.S. moved for reconsideration of her motion to
consolidate the neglect/termination proceedings. Counsel argued that the same evidence
would be presented in both cases and an adoption hearing would be necessary regardless of
the ruling on the termination issue. V.V. opposed the motion on the ground that the actions
did not involve the same parties. For example, V.V. was not yet a party to the termination
proceeding and the E.s were not pasiies in the neglect/termination hearing. The court de-
nied the motion again on June 19, 1989. Id. at 75-76.
49. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 75 (D.C. 1991) (noting that on April 6, 1989, T.S. signed a
form consenting to D.S.'s adoption by the E.s, thereby relinquishing all her custody, guar-
dianship, and parental rights over D.S. to the E.s).
50. The parties in the termination action were T.S. (the parent), D.S. (the child), and
V.V. (the foster parent), who intervened. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 73. Counsel for T.S. failed on
two occasions to convince the court to consolidate the termination/neglect action with the
adoption proceeding. Id. at 75-76. The trial court, however, considered the termination pro-
ceeding as it related to the grandparent-child relationship and not the parent-child relation-
ship. Id. at 83.
51. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 81. V.V.'s testimony involved the few times T.S. visited D.S.
Id, at 78. Mr. E. testified regarding the family's problems with T.S., which prevented them
from immediately taking D.S. from the hospital. Id. at 78. Mrs. E. testified that she only
wanted D.S. if T.S. also came so that T.S. could establish a bond with her child. Id. at 79.
Both Mr. and Mrs. E. testified regarding difficulties they encountered with the social workers
and their visitation privileges. Id- Ms. Smith, a social worker, testified to T.S.'s history of
drug usage, emotional instability, and the circumstances surrounding D.S.'s birth. Id. at 76-
77. Ms. Bowman, also a social worker, testified that Mrs. E. refused to take D.S. because she
already had a family to look after and that her relationship with T.S. was strained. Id. at 78.
Dr. Wynne, a clinical psychologist, conducted psychological testing on T.S., V.V., D.S., and
Mrs. E., and presented the test results. Id- at 77-78.
52. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 82-83 (D.C. 1991) (noting that the trial court compensated
for the practical role grandparents play in the birth family's home by inserting a new factor,
the grandparent factor, into the best interest of the child analysis under D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2353 (b)(3) (1989 & Supp. 1990)).
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grandmothers play a very practical role in the family, a role which
must be considered when the best interests of the child are adjudi-
cated.53 Here, the trial court found that the E.s acted as an impor-
tant resource for T.S. and expressed a sincere desire to maintain a
relationship with D.S.5 4
2. The Appellate Court's Holding
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
held that once a proposed adoptive parent (here, V.V.) intervened
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, it was error not to
consolidate the adoption petitions with the termination proceed-
ing.5 5 The appellate court also commented on the question of
whether continuing the grandparents' relationship with the child
was pertinent to the termination decision.5 6 According to the court,
the two issues are separate. The court criticized the trial court for
incorrectly considering the termination proceeding as it related to
the grandparent-child relationship and not limiting its consideration
to the parent-child relationship. 57 Judge Ferren noted that, unlike
many jurisdictions, the District of Columbia does not expressly
grant visitation rights to grandparents in either neglect or termina-
tion actions.58
The appellate court, however, noted that none of the parties ar-
gued that the E.s' visits should be discontinued if T.S.'s parental
53. Id at 83. The court noted the trial court's finding that:
mhe statute does not consider all the real situations which occur when juvenile
mothers are involved in matters such as fare] presented the instant case, specifically,
the practical role which grandmothers play in the birth family's home and in many
homes in the District of Columbia. Thus, the role of grandparents cannot be over-
looked in considering what is in the best interests of the child.
Id
54. Ia at 80-81. The court stated:
Both Mr. and Mrs. [E.] have expressed a sincere interest in D.S. and the court credits
that interest.... The court credits the evidence presented which demonstrates the
[E.s] sent letters to DHS and made aggravated telephone calls to DHS expressing
their desire to maintain a relationship to [D.S.] Due to the fact that [T.S.] was fifteen
when she gave birth to (D.S.], [T.S.] did not have the capacity to appropriately parent
[D.S.] However, the grandparents have acted as a resource for (T.S.]
Id.
55. Id at 89 (holding that the pending adoption and termination proceedings be consoli-
dated because V.V. intervened in the termination action, an act which exhibited her willing-
ness to confront the natural mother thereby nullifying the only reason to justify separate
termination and adoption proceedings).
56. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 83 (D.C. 1991) (finding "nothing in the statute [D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-2851 to 16-2365 (1989)] or in its legislative history that permits the court to
conceptualize a termination proceeding by substituting the grandparents for a parent, even if
the parent herself is a juvenile.").
57. Ia. at 83 n.15 (noting that the focus of the termination proceeding is the parent-child
relationship rather than the grandparent-child relationship).
58. Id. at 84 n.16.
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rights were terminated. 59 The case was remanded to the'trial court
to consolidate the competing adoption petitions with the termina-
tion proceeding.60
III. THE INFLUENCE ON THE COURTS OF GENDER, RACE,
AND CLASS IDEOLOGIES
A. A Description of the Factors
1. The Gender of the Players Through the Lens of Carol Gilligan
What ideological stances do the Maryland and D.C. courts take
with respect to these children, parents, and grandparents? The first
question is the stance of the courts with respect to gender. Before
that question can be addressed, however, one must be convinced
that the courts were aware of the gender of the players and that the
awareness made a difference.
It is clear that the judges were aware of both the sex and gender
of the players. 6 ' The Maryland judges often used a sex-specific term
when a sex-neutral one was available, even where a person's sex was
irrelevant.6 2 The D.C. judges, writing their opinion in In re D.S.,
nearly a decade later, sometimes referred to people sex-neutrally as
parents or children, rather than mother, father, and daughter, but
often referred to people using sex-specific terms. 63
Both the D.C. and the Maryland courts placed the actors in sex-
specific parent/child roles, even where the courts discussed behav-
ior that had little to do with parenthood or childhood. For example,
women were usually referred to by both courts as occupying a moth-
ering role. V.V. was usually called a foster mother, not a foster par-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 89.
61. 1 am using the term sex to refer to physical or biological characteristics usually found
in male or female bodies. The term gender refers to the social constructions that apply to
people based on their being biologically male or female. Thus, a person may be female by sex
but behave in ways socially constructed for the male gender, and vice versa. See williams,
supra note 9, at 800 (discussing the existence of both biological sex differences and social
gender differences between men and women).
62. For example, the court referred to Debra as "the unwed mother" when it discussed a
jurisdictional issue. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983).
The court also referred to Jeffrey as "an unwed father" and Debra as "the natural mother" in
the same sentence discussing parental rights. Id at 6. In addition, the court phrased its hold-
ing as "it was improper to deny the mother the right to testify" rather than using the word
"parent." Id.
63. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71 (D.C. 1991) (using the terms "parent" seventy-six times,
"child" one hundred and one times, "mother" sixty-three times, "foster mother" fifteen
times, "father" fifteen times, and "daughter" six times in the opinion).
19931
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ent. . Debra was often referred to as an "unwed mother."65 In
Skeens, the Maryland court referred to men in the context of their
fathering position, such as the "unwed father" or the "father."
'66
This was true even though one grandfather also acted as an attorney
in the case.
67
The judges applied gender-specific stereotypes to the actors in
the cases. Stereotyping, in this context, means the application of
general norms or expectations to a person without taking into ac-
count evidence about his or her specific life circumstances or charac-
teristics.6 8 For example, the Maryland trial court conditioned its
award of temporary custody of Michael to his aunt and uncle on the
aunt's quitting her job.69 There is no evidence in the opinion indi-
cating what kind ofjob she held, why quitting was necessary for the
baby's well-being, or why the aunt rather than the uncle should be
the one to quit.7 0 One can safely assume, therefore, that the court
was applying the stereotypical notions that no mothers (or other wo-
man caring for children) should work outside the home, while all
fathers should engage in paid employment.
7 '
Often the gender stereotypes employed by the courts seem to
come directly out of the work of Carol Gilligan.72 Gilligan's argu-
ment, stated broadly, is that women share a morality of care and
connection, with relationships taking priority over individuality or
autonomy. Men, on the other hand, are more rights-oriented, and
seek to validate themselves as separated from others, self-directed
64. See id. at 73-89 (employing the term "foster mother" fifteen times and the term "fos-
ter parent" three times in the opinion).
65. See Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983)
(using the term "unwed mother" in two out of four of the questions the appellants presented
for review); Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (using the term
"unmarried minor" to refer to Debra).
66. See Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94 slip op. at 3, 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983)
(referring to Jeffrey as an "unwed father" three times); id. at 5, 13 (referring to Edward Skeens
as "Debra's father" and "her father").
67. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting that Edward
John Skeens represented the appellants, Debra Skeens, Edward Skeens, and Dorothy Skeens).
68. See THE AMERCAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 668 (2d ed. 1983) (defining a stereotype as
a conventional and usually oversimplified belief or conception).
69. Skeens, No. 94 slip op. at 3.
70. Id. The persuasive authority of gender stereotypes overwhelms even precedent, on
occasion. A full decade before this decision, the Maryland courts found that custody decisions
based on sex were violative of gender equity. See McAndrew v. McAndrew, 382 A.2d 1081,
1086 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (holding that Maryland may not apply a maternal preference
in custody cases pursuant to a newly enacted Maryland statute).
71. Czapanskiy, supra note 9.
72. See GILLIGAN, supra note 8 (arguing that women speak in a "different voice" from
men, reflecting their different conceptions of self and morality and different experiences of
conflict and choice).
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and standing alone.73 In this sense, according to Gilligan's theory, a
good mother is one who values and maintains connection, while a
good father is one who asserts his rights. The court's use of these
gender stereotypes should come as no surprise to those who accept
Joan Williams's critical insight that Gilligan's work accurately de-
scribes the ideology of gender relations in the late twentieth
century.7 4
What is unusual about the Skeens and In re D.S. cases is that the
courts apply these gender ideologies to the grandparents. The
grandparents come in pairs, with one member of each pair being
biologically male and one biologically female.7 5 Consequently, the
courts find it hard to insist that each mixed-gender pair of grandpar-
ents behave more like a stereotypical man or a stereotypical woman.
Rather than giving up on gender, however, both courts seem to ask
the grandparents to act as a unit in accord with the stereotypes of
both men and women. As I discuss more fully later, the grandpar-
ents must value care and connection above all else, but they must
express the values with a rights-oriented toughness and vigor.7 6
2. The Race of the Players
How the gender ideologies play out, as we Will see, is influenced
by race. Two pairs of grandparents are European-American; one
pair is African-American.7 7 The European-Americans are allowed
to place a lower value on informal kinship relationships than the
African-American grandparents, who are expected to seek and fos-
ter informal kinship relationships.78 Also, the European-Americans
73. GILLXGAN, supra note 8, at 19-21, 64-66, 82-83. Gilligan's conception of women's
morality is concerned with care and nurturing, consequently, women's moral development is
characterized by a concern for maintaining relationships. GILtGOAx, supra note 8, at 19-21, 64-
66, 82-83. Conversely, according to Gilligan, men do not focus on relationships, are defined
by individual achievement, and are characterized as separate and autonomous. GIuMGAN,
supra note 8, at 19-21, 64-66, 82-83.
74. Williams, supra note 9, at 799-802. Williams criticizes Gilligan's gender ideas for
being a mere reflection of the present, oppressive gender system, not a description of actual
gender difference. Williams, supra note 9, at 802. Similarly, I make no claim, and in fact do
not believe, that Gilligan is accurately describing concrete differences between men and wo-
men. See also, Williams, supra note 9, at 803 n.17 (discussing literature that responds to Carol
Gilligan's arguments).
75. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71. 75 (D.C. 1991); Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73 (characterizing the female gender stereo-
type as focusing on nurturing and relationships, and characterizing the male stereotype as
valuing and preserving individual rights).
77. I determined the race of the parties through conversations with colleagues and court
personnel.
78. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 75 (reciting at length the behavior of the E.s, including
their refusal to take D.S. into their home after returning home from the hospital). This recita-
tion suggests an implicit expectation, by the court, that the E.s will immediately develop a
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are expected to have options-about how to treat an illegitimate
child; the African-Americans are expected to fully accept the illegiti-
mate child.79  , -
3. The Class of the Players
Class bias is also a factor that crosses and confuses race and gen-
der when it comes to expectations about who will hold paid employ-
ment, who will dedicate himself or herself to the unpaid care of a
child, who will litigate, and which issues will be litigated.80
B. How the Factors Influence the Courts: Some Telling Examples
1. The Influence of Gender on the Judicial Evaluation of the
Grandparents: Being a Good Mother and Good Father
Looking at these cases through the lens of gender stereotypes
helps to explain the somewhat contradictory conclusions arrived at
by the two courts. The double-gender grandparents, those exhibit-
ing both the male and female stereotypes, mostly win. The single-
gender grandparents, those exhibiting only one of the male or fe-
male stereotypes, mostly lose.8'
relationship with D.S. This expectation is rooted in the image of an African-American woman
as an asexual, maternal, black mammy. As a slave, she was the passive nurturer who gave
without any expectation of reward and who reared the children of others as if they were hei
own. Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 Am. U. J. GENDER
& L. 12-16 (1993).
See also CAROL STAcx, ALL OUR KIN-STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY
(Harper Colophon ed., Harper & Row 1975)(1974) (describing the prevalence of informal
kinship relationships among black families in a poor section of Chicago); Sr. Mary Jean Fla-
herty, Seven Caring Functions of Black Grandmothers in Adolescent Mothering, 17 MATERNAL-CHILD
NURSING J. 191, 192 (1988) (noting that lower-class African-American families differ from
middle-class families in that, among other things, grandmothers in African-American families
care for the youngest generation). Kinship care is increasing. See eg., TASK FORCE ON PERMA-
NENCY PLANNING FOR FOSTER CHILDREN, INC., KINSHIP FOSTER CARE: THE DOUBLE EDGED DI-
LEMMA (1990) (revealing that in New York City in 1990,45.6 percent of children were placed
with relatives in foster care); James F. Kennedy & Virginia T. Keeney, The Extended Family
Revisited Grandparents Rearing Grandchildren, 19 CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND HUM. DEv. 26, 26-27
(1988) (citing from Census Bureau data that in 1981, 3.7 percent of minor children were
living apart from their parents; in 1990, the figure was suspected to rise to 4.1 percent).
79. The different choices permitted European-American families versus African-Ameri-
can families reflect, to some extent, slave-era patriarchical society choices. White slave own-
ers had choices such that children, fathered by them and borne by their slaves, would be
raised as slaves. Slaves had no choice but to care for these children, and any other children
placed in their care. See Roberts, supra note 78 (describing familial relationships of slaves and
slave-owners).
80. For example, it is assumed that Michael's aunt, rather than his uncle, will quit herjob
to care for Michael. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94, slip op. at 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23,
1983). This assumption reflects expectations about the gender roles of middle-class families.
See CHODOROW, supra note 8, at 64 (describing child care, and non-economic contribution, as
the middle-class housewife's important contribution).
81. The double-gender grandparents, the Paternos, mostly win by successfully blocking
Michael's adoption and securing liberal visitation rights, but fail to gain custody in their first
attempt. The Skeens mostly lose because although Debra gains custody of Michael, she and
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The only double-gender grandparents to appear in these cases
were the Paternos, whose very name resonates with "Pater
Familias."' ' 2 The Paternos were successful in achieving their goals:
preventing the adoption of their grandchild, and gaining the right to
substantial contact with him. They also avoided being criticized or
having their involvement revealed by the appellate panels, although
the evidence suggests that they, and not their son, controlled the
litigation and stood to benefit from a favorable outcome.8 3
The prime example of the favored treatment accorded the
Paternos is that they were awarded substantial visitation with
Michael, although they were not parties to the litigation. 4 The ap-
pellate court holds that grandparents may petition for and be
awarded visitation rights in Maryland, and upholds the grant of visi-
tation to the Paternos. In fact, however, the Paternos never appear
to have petitioned for anything; only their son is a party to the law-
suit.8 5 Since they were not parties to any court order, it is even un-
clear whether the Paternos would have been subject to a contempt
order if they, for example, failed to return Michael to his custodial
parent at the conclusion of a scheduled visit.86 In other words, they
appear to have left the lawsuit with rights but no responsibilities,
either financial or custodial.
87
her parents must abandon their plan to have Michael adopted, and must submit to liberal
visitation by the Paternos. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984). The
E.s mostly lose because although T.S. has consented to their adoption of D.S., this court's
reversal of the lower court's decision to not terminate T.S.'s parental rights will make it more
difficult for the E.s to adopt D.S. in the future. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71 (D.C. 1991).
892. "Pater Familias" is defined as "father as head and representative of the household."
Cmw.nLs T. Lawis & CHARLEs SHORT, HARPER'S LATIN DICrIoNARY 1313 (E.A. Andrews, ed.,
1907).
83. Sheens, 480 A.2d at 822, 827. That the Paternos controlled the litigation is demon-
strated by the fact that they were payingJeffrey's legal fees. A private Baltimore firm, whose
fees exceededJeffrey's Navy pay, representedjeffrey. See infra note 133 (establishingJeffrey's
pay in the Navy). In fact, the court highlighted Jeffrey's financial status by noting that there
was no abuse of discretion by the chancellor in not compelling the "impecunious" Jeffrey to
pay a portion of the expenses associated with Debra's pregnancy and recovery. Skeens, 480
A.2d at 829.
84. Skeens, 480 A.2d at 820 (naming only Jeffrey Paterno as plaintiff).
85. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984). Even though the
Paternos are not a party to the lawsuit, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals characterizes
the lawsuit as a "dispute about visitation rights of the father and paternal grandparents of an
illegitimate child." Id at 822.
86. Id. at 823 (reciting the Paternos visitation rights under Judge Ahalt's order which,
because they are not named parties in the suit, does not legally bind them).
87. See generally Czapanskiysupra note 9 (analyzing parenting roles in terms of volunteers
and draftees). Volunteers are usually fathers who have a choice about whether to initiate a
relationship with their children. Thus, the volunteer's care of a child is viewed as virtuous,
but not a required choice. Draftees, on the other hand, are usually mothers who have no
choice; for them the job of parenting is inevitable. The Paternos are analogous to the volun-
teer parent: they have a choice about the extent of their parenting, but no responsibility arises
from their role.
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I think the Paternos convinced the court that they were entitled to
favorable treatment by being a good mother and a good father who
exhibit the qualities of double-gendered grandparents. The
Paternos wanted a connection with their grandchild and were will-
ing to care for him. Therefore, they served as the good mother fos-
tering relationships and the ethic of care.88 The Skeens, by way of
contrast, were willing to see their grandchild adopted and lose con-
tact with him altogether. They were the bad mother who was willing
to sever the relationship.
In addition, the Paternos acted as the good father by having
money and being willing to invest it in an aggressive fight to assert
their son's rights to the grandchild.8 9 After retaining a major law
firm,90 the Paternos helped their son file suit only a few days after
the child's birth. They fought hard every step of the way.9 1 In con-
trast, the Skeens relied on Mr. Skeens to act as their lawyer and,
when push came to shove, gave up their adoption plans in favor of
custody for Debra, rather than fight to the bitter end.92 Clearly, the
Skeens were not the better father of the two.
Like the Skeens, the E.s failed to exhibit good double-gender be-
haviors. And, like the Skeens, they lost rights as a result of the ap-
pellate decision. T.S. had consented to the E.s' adoption of D.S.93
But, if the parental rights of T.S. were terminated, her consent
would become meaningless. The appellate decision was unfavora-
ble for the E.s because it reversed the decision not to terminate
T.S.'s rights on the ground that preserving the relationship between
the E.s and D.S. was irrelevant to the termination petition.94 Since
the trial court had denied termination solely for that reason, the re-
mand was likely to result in termination.
Beyond losing, the E.s suffered substantial criticism by the appel-
late court for their failure to conform to dual-gender norms. Three
88. See GiLLrGAN, supra note 8, at 62-63, 79, 100 (relating that the ideal of care is seeing
and responding to need, thereby sustaining the web of connection).
89. See GLLiGAN, supra note 8, at 100 (expressing that men's moral imperative acts to
protect the right to self-fulfillment).
90. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec App. 1984) (listing counsel for
appellee as Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner, and Smouse, P.A.).
91. See id (characterizing the proceedings as "a battle about adoption" and "a dispute
about visitation rights").
92. See id (noting that although the suit began as a battle about the Skeens putting
Debra's child up for adoption, after a plethora of subsequent judicial activity, the adoption
issue disappeared and the case evolved into a dispute about the liberal visitation rights
awarded to the father and the paternal grandparents).
93. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 75 (D.C. 1991) (reciting that on April 6, 1989, T.S. signed a
form consenting to the E.s' adoption of D.S., at which time the termination motion and the




examples demonstrate the court's perspective. First, although it was
largely irrelevant to the outcome, the court quoted extensive testi-
mony concerning the decision of the E.s not to take in their
grandchild at birth.95 Second, the court noted that the E.s did not
believe or act on T.S.'s charges when she was younger that her bio-.
logical father sexually abused her.96 Third, the court noted the E.s'
failure to be a good father when they did not vigorously assert their
legal rights to visit D.S.97
Absent the good mother/good father ideals applied to these three
sets of decisions, the court could have construed the E.s' decisions
and behavior in a more positive light. According to the E.s, they
refused to take their grandchild from the hospital because they
wanted to foster a relationship between the baby and her mother,
and therefore, would not take the baby alone.98 Also, the E.s were
concerned that taking care of D.S. and T.S. would impair their abil-
ity to meet the needs of the other members of their household.99
While their hope that a relationship might develop between T.S.
and D.S. was unfulfilled, their attempt to foster a parent-child rela-
tionship in the first place is negative only if they are expected to be
the good mother that their child was not, while simultaneously be-
ing the good father. The good mother, in this setting, would have
performed the care the infant needed, rather than tried to assist
someone else in providing the care. The good father would not
have given primacy to the needs of other household members, be-
cause the good father would be more likely to view each household
member as a separate individual rather than as an interactive mem-
ber of the group. In order for the E.s to be good mother/good fa-
ther in this difficult situation, it appears that they should have taken
D.S. home while refusing T.S. access to their home. In that way, the
E.s would have connected with the grandchild and asserted their
rights against the mother.100
95. Id at 78 (recounting that Mrs. E. refused to take D.S. because she had never gotten
along with T.S. and had two other children as well as her husband to look after). See also
Gmu~trAN, supra note 8, at 76 (describing a mother in the societal and physical sense as one
who cares for and protects the child).
96. Id at 78-79.
97. Id at 79 (testifying that although they-the E.s-had a court appointed attorney,
they did not utilize the attorney's services to expand their visitation rights). See also GiLLiGAN,
supra note 8, at 19 (quotinga male subject who describes his morality as focusing on the rights
of individuals).
98. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 79 (D.C. 1991) (reciting testimony of Mrs. E. concerning
events after the birth of D.S.).
99. Id. at 78.
100. See GiLLIGAN.supra note 8, at 19, 100 (relating an interview in which a man discusses
the importance of individual rights); see also supra text accompanying notes 89 and 97 (describ-
ing a good father as being assertive of rights).
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The second example of the E.s' failure to meet dual-gender
norms is their failure to believe T.S.'s allegations about being
abused by her biological father.1' 1 The question is whether the be-
havior for which the E.s are criticized is bad maternal behavior, bad
paternal behavior, or bad dual-gender behavior. In other words,
should a good mother have sought to protect her daughter even if
the allegation was ambiguous, or should she have given the alleged
abusing father the benefit of any doubt about credibility? Should a
good (step)-father have acted the same as a good mother, or
differently?
Interestingly, the same court that decided In re D.S. also decided
the now infamous case of Morgan v. Foretich.10 2 In Morgan, the court
upheld an order for unsupervised visitation by a father who, the
mother believed, had sexually abused the young daughter, and
where the evidence was in equipoise.10 - A good mother, the court
seems to suggest, would have given the father the benefit of the
doubt. A good mother who believes the child instead will risk de-
stroying the father-child relationship and will fail to fulfill her role as
the nurturer of that relationship.
Why, then, are the E.s criticized for not acting on their daughter's
charges? According to the Morgan court, a good mother should
have done exactly what the E.s did. Good grandparents, however,
are expected to act both as a good mother and as a good father. The
step-father here, Mr. E., should have joined with the mother and
asserted their rights; in this case, their right to protect the child. As
a man, the step-father is under no duty to foster a parent-child rela-
tionship between his step-daughter and her biological father. He is
permitted to claim that the child is better off alone, separated from
the relationship. Where the E.s had failed, then, is in not acting as a
good father should. The court views this fact as indicating bad pa-
ternal behavior.
Finally, there is the issue of why the E.s were not assertive in a
legal forum when their visitation with D.S. was changed from rela-
tively free access to D.S. in V.V.'s home to a more restrictive ar-
101. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 78 (D.C. 1991).
102. 546 A.2d 407 (D.C. 1988); In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 73. Judge Steadman wrote the
opinion in Morgan v. Foretich and sat on the panel that decided In re D.S.
103. See Morgan, 546 A.2d at 410 (upholding the trial court's decision to permit a two
week unsupervised visit by the alleged victim's allegedly abusive father). Morgan took ex-
treme steps to protect and care for her daughter by unequivocally refusing to comply with the
visitation order. The court found Morgan in contempt and ordered her incarcerated. Id at
409.
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rangement in a social worker's office.104 As the court observed, the
E.s had a court-appointed attorney 1 5 and were aware that the attor-
ney could have raised the visitation issue for them in court. 10 6 .Since
they did not ask their attorney to do so, the implication is that they
were deficient in two ways: a caring mother would not have acceded
to being separated from her child, while an assertive father would
not have let his visitation rights be abridged.10 7 If the court could
have put aside its double-gender stereotype, however, other reasons
could be seen for the E.s not contesting the limitations on their visi-
tation with D.S. For example, there is the fact that their attorney
was court-appointed. 08 Unlike the Paternos, the E.s did not have
money for a private lawyer.' 0 9 While people who have never had to
rely on a court-appointed attorney might reject this notion, it is en-
104. In June 1987, the E.s were given liberal visitation of D.S. at V.V.'s house, including
overnight and weekend stays with the E.s. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 75 n.5. By May 1989, the E.s
were no longer allowed to visit D.S. at V.V.'s home and could only visit D.S. at the social
worker's office. Id Both of the E.s testified that the social worker had made visitation difficult
after this occurred. !d at 79. Despite the fact that the E.s' attorney was not helpful, they did
not ask for new counsel. Id. Moreover, nowhere does the court mention that the E.s sought
to use the legal process to obtain more visitation time with D.S. Id.
105. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 79.
106. An attorney is required to advise his/her clients of these types of matters. See WAsii-
INGTON, D.C. RULEs OF PROFESsIONAL CONDuCr Rule IA(b) (1990) (requiring counsel to give
his/her client sufficient explanation of a legal matter so that the client will be able to make
"informed decisions" regarding the matter); id cmt. 2 (stating that a client is entitled to all of
the information about the "subject matter of the representation").
107. Because women are largely responsible for child care, girls tend to experience their
mothers as being "more like, and continuous with, themselves." GILUcGAN, supra note 8, at 7
(quoting University of California at Berkeley sociology professor Nancy Chodorow). This
means that girls fuse the experience of forming an attachment with a person (first with their
mother, later with others) and the "process of identity formation." Gilligan, supra note 8, at 7-
8. Thus, a woman who chooses not to see her child could be perceived as unnatural or defi-
cient.
Boys, on the other hand, experience "more emphatic individuation and a more defensive
firming of experienced ego boundaries" in forming an identity. GxLUAAN, supra note 8, at 8.
By failing to assert his right to see his child, a man could be perceived as weak and
unassertive.
108. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 75 n.5, 79 (D.C. 1991) (noting that the E.s were appointed
counsel by the court inJuly 1986).
Consider this statement from a legal aid lawyer about a consultation with a client:
I hadn't spent enough time with Mrs. G the previous Friday. For me, it had been one
more emergency - a quick fix, an appointment, out the door. It suddenly seemed
pointless to process so many clients, in such haste, without any time to listen, to
challenge, to think together. But what to do, with so many people at the door?
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. Rav. 1, 23 (1990). See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid
UnderAdvanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474, 540-50,579-86 (1985) (stating that Legal Aid
offices in the United States are chronically under-funded and under-staffed, causing many
attorneys to give only cursory attention to the majority of their cases); Firsthand Accounts of
Capitaijustice, NAT'L LJ.,June 11, 1990, at 40 (quoting from a survey of sixty court-appointed
attorneys to capital murder trials, which found that many felt that they were inadequately
prepared for all or part of the trial and that they had inadequate resources to prepare an
adequate defense).
109. See supra note 90.
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tirely possible that counsel for the E.s would have been far less re-
ceptive to their request to fight for visitation than privately-retained
counsel for the Paternos might have been. Also, the E.s might have
been reluctant to ask their court-appointed attorney to be assertive
for them, because the entire relationship might have made them feel
embarrassed about accepting charity.110 Thus, the impact of class,
expressed in the absence of money for a lawyer, may have been in-
terpreted by the court in negative ways against the E.s.
In light of a double-gender stereotype, the court may have been
expecting the E.s to be assertive about visitation rights because that
is what good, rights-oriented fathers would do." I The E.s' decision
not to assert visitation rights was wrong, therefore, because it was
not rights-oriented. It could be seen positively, however, if one
were to believe that working things out privately is preferable to ad-
versarial litigation. A non-litigious orientation is sometimes identi-
fied with the feminine, however. 112 To a court which was looking
for the mother and the father in a grandparent," 3 a non-litigious
orientation may have seemed too unbalanced toward the mother
side of the equation.
2. The Influence of Gender on the Judicial Evaluation of the
Grandparent-Parent Relationship
A. Atomism versus Connection
In finding that T.S. must be evaluated as a parent separately from
her parents, the D.C. court values atomism or individuality over re-
lationships or connection. In permitting Jeffrey and his parents to
act together in their relationship with Michael, the Maryland court
values relationships over individuality. The question is whether the
110. See generally White, supra note 108 (telling the story of an indigent client, Mrs. G.,
from a legal aid lawyer's perspective, and indicating that a dient's pride can affect
representation).
I 11. See GtLUGAN, supra note 8 (describing the relationship-oriented natures of women
versus the rights-oriented natures of men). Carol Gilligan illustrates the male rights oriented
mentality in herJake and Amy study. In this study, she demonstrates her theory that men,
even by age eleven, emphasize logic and individual rights over morality and the common
good when resolving dilemmas involving a conflict between rights and morality. GILLtoAN,
supra note 8, at 24-39, 49.51.
112. Carrie Menkel-Meadow observes that some women have "difficulty with the 'macho'
ethic of the courtroom battle," and even when they are able to adopt the male model, women
are often "confronted [with] a dilemma because women Care] less likely to be perceived as
behaving properly when engaged in strong adversarial conduct." Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.
39, 53-54 (1985). Menkel-Meadow also observes that "left to their own devices," women
might develop "alternatives to the adversary model," in the form of alternative dispute reso-
lution models such as mediation. Id at 52-53.
113. See supra text accompanying note 76 (asserting that the grandparents are treated ac-
cording to double-gender stereotypes).
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apparently opposing value perspectives are coincidental or whether
they have something to do with the gender of the parent involved.
My hunch is that the gender of the parent has at least some influ-
ence. As Professor Carol Gilligan has demonstrated, social norms
about women require women to nurture connection and relation-
ships. 1 4 Men, on the other hand, are expected to be independent
and self-regarding.1 15 Stereotypical gender thinking would suggest
that a woman should have no problem doing her nurturing work. In
that arena, she should be able to stand on her own two feet, separate
from any dependencies which she might have. If she should have to
rely on grandparents to help her have a relationship with her child,
therefore, there must be something wrong with her.
Stereotypical gender thinking also would suggest that a man
would have enormous difficulty taking care of a child, particularly an
infant.'1 6 For him to rely on his parents-particularly his mother-
114. GILLIGAN, supra note 8. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 112, at 43 (stating that
Gilligan has determined that "women experience themselves through connections and rela-
tionships to others"); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Theorelics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive
Thought and Action: Styles of Lawyering, 43 HAsINGs LJ. 1039, 1047 (1992) (summarizing
Gilligan's assertion that "women use an ethic of care in their moral reasoning"). Professor
Gilligan is not describing accurately the realities experienced by men and women, but she is
accurately describing how we expect men and women to behave and experience reality.
Williams, supra note 9. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1565 (1991) (asserting that Gilligan's" 'conventional feminine voice'
reflects how conventional gender training instructs women to behave."). I am discussing here
the social norms attached to social constructions of gender, not the lived realities of men and
women.
115. GILLitAN, supra note 8. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 112, at 43 (stating that
Gilligan has observed that "men see themselves as separately identified individuals"); see also
Cahn, supra note 114, at 1047-48 (summarizing Gilligan's assertion that "men are more ori-
ented to an ethic of rights... [and] are oriented towards individual autonomy and impartial
rules.").
116. The tender years presumption, which proposes that women are better suited than
men to raise children under the age of seven, governed custody decisions for about fifty years,
ending approximately twenty years ago. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L REv. 727, 738 (1988)
(describing the doctrine as one which gives the mother "ownership" rights to the children
absent a showing of her unfitness). This presumption may have had the effect of discouraging
fathers from seeking custody of younger children, which further perpetuated the stereotype
that men are less capable of caring for infants. See GEoFFmEY L. GREiF, SINGLE FATHERS 85
(1985) (stating that not only are fathers capable of caring for young children, but they actually
feel more comfortable with them than with older children).
By the early 1970s, fathers' rights groups were successfully challenging the tender years
presumption as one which promoted a pro-mother bias in custody decisions. Fineman, supra,
at 738-39 (describing the effects of "male backlash" on the tender years presumption). Fur-
ther, "mainstream feminists" challenged the presumption on the grounds that it perpetuated
the stereotype that women should raise children. Fineman, supra, at 738-39 (describing the
effects of "feminist equality rhetoric" on the presumption). See Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d
686, 695 (Ala. 1981) (holding that the presumption is an unconstitutional gender-based clas-
sification).
By the early 1990s the presumption had fallen out of favor with the courts. See Trina Grillo,
The .fediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YAx L.j. 1545, 1570 (1991) (stating
that the "laws governing custody are now, in theory, gender neutral."); Gary Crippen, Stum-
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would be neither a surprise nor a problem.117 Thus, even though a
stereotypical man should be fully independent in every other aspect
of his life, there is no adequate reason to believe that he would be
able to care for a child alone.
B. Individualism and Relationship
It is also interesting that in the case of T.S. and the E.s, there is
extensive evidence about their flawed relationship, while the appel-
late record is silent about the nature of the relationship between
Jeffrey and the Paternos. 1 8 Recall that the D.C. Court of Appeals
decided to remand the case to consolidate the termination proceed-
ing with the competing adoption proceedings. 119 The exact rela-
tionship between T.S. and the E.s was, therefore, something that
would be fully investigated on remand 120 and that was largely irrele-
vant to the appellate decision, except in broad outlines. Nonethe-
less, the D.C. Court of Appeals discussed at length the fact that T.S.
had been adjudicated to be a neglected child 121 suffering from sub-
stantial emotional problems. 122 According to the evidence recited
by the appellate court, a major source of T.S.'s emotional problems
and of her eventual alienation from the E.s was the sexual abuse she
bling Beyond Best Interests of the Chikk Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the PAimary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 434-
40 (1990) (describing various custody standards, including the primary caretaker standard,
with which many states have replaced the tender years presumption).
117. Indeed, many custody decisions favoring fathers turn on the existence of a grand-
mother with whom the father and child will live. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 9, at 239 (citing
Galayas v. Galayas, 75 Mich. App. 128, 254 N.W.2d 818 (1977), a case in which custody was
awarded to the father because, among other factors, his mother was going to care for the
child). The fact that the child's mother had remarried in Galayas had no effect on this case.
The court was more concerned with the fact that the mother worked and could not be home
during the day to care for the children. Polikoff, supra note 9, at 239. See also Susan B. Boyd,
Child Custody and Working Mothers in THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL BIAS ON FAMILY LAw 168, 179
(stating that "custody decisions may favour the parent who can offer a family set-up (resem-
bling] the traditional nuclear family, incuding 'female care,"' and in many of these cases a
grandmother "was willing to perform the stay-at-home motherly functions" for a father who
gained custody).
118. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 77-79 (D.C. 1991) (summarizing the testimony of several trial
witnesses concerning the relationship between T.S. and the E.s); Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d
820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
119. In reD.S., 600 A.2d at 73-74, 89.
120. In order for the lower court to make a proper determination as to the competing
adoption proceedings and the termination proceeding, the relationship between T.S. and the
E.s would need further exploration. Otherwise, the court would be unable to rule on the E.s'
adoption motion. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74, 89 (stating that consolidation of the adoption
petitions was in the best interests of the child).
121. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74 (noting that T.S. herself had been adjudicated a
neglected child in 1985, approximately one year before D.S.'s birth).
122. Id at 76-77 (summarizing the trial court testimony of doctors and social workers
concerning T.S.'s emotional problems).
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suffered at age nine at the hands of her biological father.123 The
court reviewed in detail the considerable testimony that was taken
on the question of why the E.s had failed to believe her and report
the abuse124 and how this continued to be an issue in their relation-
ship for many years. 125
The Maryland case, in contrast to the D.C. case, turned on
whether the grandparents should be allowed to exercise visitation
rights with their grandson while their son was absent due to naval
duty. 126 Their visitation rights were upheld on the rationale that
grandparental visitation would allow Jeffrey to have a relationship
with his son as well as allow the grandchild to maintain contact with
his paternal family.' 2 7 Obviously, no such benefit would accrue if
the parent and grandparents were alienated from one another. The
record in the Maryland case, nonetheless, is silent on the nature of
the relationship between the Paternos and their son Jeffrey. For all
we can tell from the appellate decision, their relationship could have
been described as negatively as that of the E.s and T.S.
One must ask, therefore, why the D.C. Court of Appeals focused
its attention on the grandparent-parent relationship in a case where
the issue is largely irrelevant, while the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals ignored the apparent absence of evidence on the same
question, although it was central to the issues. I think it relates to
the care and connection stereotype of women versus the individual-
ism stereotype of men. 128 The D.C. Court of Appeals may have un-
derstood that its decision to permit the termination of parental
rights of a mother could be seen as inconsistent with the usual ste-
reotypes about the motherliness of women. In response, the judges
may have felt compelled to provide additional justification in the
form of evidence that this particular woman could not get along
with anyone, even her own parents. However, for the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals to raise the possibility that Jeffrey could
123. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 77 n.11 (D.C. 1991) (summarizing the trial court testimony
outlining the progression and effects of childhood sexual abuse).
124. For example, when asked at trial about T.S.'s report of sexual abuse, Mr. E. de-
scribed it as "like the boy who cried wolf" and claimed that T.S. played "head games" with
the E.s about the issue. Id. at 79 n.12.
125. Id. at 77 (summarizing a psychologist's evaluation of T.S. as suffering from low self-
esteem and emotional problems, stemming in part from her childhood sexual abuse and Mrs.
E.'s subsequent refusal to believe T.S. about the alleged abuse).
126. Skeens v. Patemo, 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (stating that the
case "is now essentially a dispute about visitation rights of the father and paternal grandpar-
ents of an illegitimate child.").
127. Id. at 826-27 (noting thatJeffrey's absence due to naval duty constituted an excep-
tional circumstance under which grandparental visitation rights would be granted).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 73 for a discussion of Carol Gilligan's argu-
ment regarding female connectedness and male individualism.
19931 105
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW[
have had problems with his parents would have jeopardized award-
ing substantial visitation to him sinceJeffrey, being a man, is not the
stereotypically correct choice for parenthood. 129 Unless his parents
are involved in the care of the baby, therefore, the decision of the
Maryland court to uphold Jeffrey's substantial visitation could be
just as questionable as the D.C. court's decision to terminate the
parental rights of T.S. In other words, without the grandparents,
Jeffrey is unable to provide a stereotypically satisfactory mother for
his son.
C. Independnce and Dependency
Gender ideologies seem to control the court's view of whether
Jeffrey is independent of his parents or dependent on them. When
Jeffrey is in need of a female parent for Michael, he is viewed as
being close to his parents, although no evidence is cited to support
such a view, as discussed in the previous section. When Jeffrey has
to be independent of his parents in order to satisfy his gendered
role, the court overlooks evidence of his financial dependency on
them. This is evident when one examines the question of who actu-
ally controlled the litigation. The court claimed thatJeffirey brought
and controlled the lawsuit.1 30 That this was a fiction is obvious in
the opinions themselves. In fact, the Paterno grandparents must
have controlled the litigation. The evidence is in the counsel:
Jeffrey was represented by one of the most aggressive and expensive
law firms available in Maryland at the time.13 1 Nonetheless, the ap-
pellate court defended its decision not to require Jeffrey to pay for
Debra's hospitalization because it was "concerned with Jeffrey's
ability to pay."' 3 2 His entire income was from the Navy, not an em-
ployer known for paying salaries high enough to pay the most ex-
129. This is particularly true of single men who seek custody or visitation rights. Some
courts are more willing to give custody or liberal visitation rights to a father who remarries
after a divorce or who lives with his parents. See e.g., Galayas v. Galayas, 254 N.W.2d 818
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (granting custody to the father whose mother cared for the child even
though the mother had remarried); Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589 (Kan. 1978) (empha-
sizing that the father's remarriage was the main factor in granting him custody); see also
Polikoff, supra note 9 (discussing cases where the father was granted custody where female
care was provided to the child); Boyd supra note 117 (noting Canadian cases where evidence
that the father's mother or other female relative would be caring for the children influenced
the judge's decision in awarding custody to the father.)
130. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983) (naming
'Jeff" as the person bringing the injunction), Skeens v. Paterno 480 A.2d 820, 823 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984) (referring to the Paterno side as 'Jeffrey" and the Skeens side as "Skeens"
and occasionally "Debra").
131. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
132. Skeens, 480 A.2d at 828-29 (describing Jeffrey as "impecunious" and deferring to
Judge Ahalt's "concern[] withJeffrey's ability to pay" in upholding the decision not to require
Jeffrey to pay Debra's hospital expenses).
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pensive legal fees in town.1- The fiction of Jeffrey controlling the
suit is necessary in both an obvious and obscure way because of
Jeffrey's gender. The fiction is necessary in an obvious way because,
in stereotypical terms, it is embarrassing for a man to be dependent
on his parents for money. However, it is not embarrassing, and
often expected, for a woman to be financially dependent on her par-
ents or mate.134 Without a second thought, therefore, the Maryland
court charged Debra's parents with her hospital costs, because she
was believed to be their dependent minor child although there was
little evidence that she was. 135 At the same time, Jeffrey's actual fi-
nancial dependency on his parents was, for reasons of fundamental
courtesy, ignored.
The obscure part of the issue arises when one considers who was
probably more interested in the child: Jeffrey or his parents. So
long as the court pretended that the father was the real party, it did
not need to confront the fact that it was giving priority to the desires
of the paternal grandparents over the desires of the mother. The
court could instead conceptualize the conflict as one between two
people in equal positions with respect to the baby: the mother and
the father.' 36 Therefore, the issue was framed as one of sex equity,
not one of power relations. If, however, Jeffrey had not sought cus-
tody of Michael and was only present to provide the biological link
between the Paternos and Michael, then the court would have had
to directly consider whether the interests of the grandparents were
of greater weight than the interests of the mother.13 7 Because men
are generally considered autonomous beings, separate from their
families, 38 Jeffrey's control over the litigation was an easy fiction to
133. A seaman recruit would have received a base pay of $448.80 per month in 1982.
Telephone Interview with Paula Murphy, Reference Librarian, Navy Department Library,
Washington, D.C. (jan. 13, 1993).
134. Cf Williams, supra note 9, at 822-23 (discussing the gendered structure of the West-
ern wage labor system and how men "are raised to believe they have the right and the respon-
sibility to perform as ideal workers," whereas women "generally feel that they are entitled to
the pleasure of spending time with their children while [their children] are small.").
135. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 829 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting that the
Skeens, "as parents of a minor, Debra, had an obligation to provide for her support" and that
"Edward provided for that obligation in part through his health insurance.").
136. See iUL at 826 (indicating that the court's main concern was whetherJeffrey would be
able to maintain a relationship with Michael, not whether the grandparents should be given
custody or visitation).
137. See id. (holding that the grandparents could be granted custody of and visitation
rights to their grandchildren "only under exceptional circumstances" in a context other than
termination of marriage).
138. See Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979) (articulating the insight that Western wage labor is pre-
mised on an ideal worker with no child care responsibilities); Williams, supra note 9, at 823
("[E]ven upon their return to work, the near-universal tendency is to assume that women's
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accept. As a result, the confrontation of grandparents versus
mother never had to occur.
3. The Influence of Race on the Judicial Evaluation of the Grandparents
Another useful contrast is between the judicial treatment of the
Skeens and that of the E.s. Neither set of grandparents prevailed in
their respective actions,' 3 9 so in that way they are similar. The
Skeens, although parties to the action and represented by counsel,
are not critically discussed or negatively described. Rather, they are
treated in a neutral fashion by the court, and are only discussed in
connection with the statement of the facts and when the court is
explaining their arguments on appeal. 140 The E.s, although not par-
ties to the case, are subject to substantial negative attention by the
court. For example, testimony about the many ways they could be
seen to have failed both their daughter and their grandchild is not
only cited, 141 it is quoted.'4 2
In part, the difference in the court's treatment of the E.s and the
Skeens seems attributable to racial stereotyping. The E.s, as Afri-
can-American grandparents, and particularly Mrs. E., as an African-
American grandmother, are expected, apparently, to be more nur-
turing than the average family. They "should" unquestioningly wel-
come their daughter's child into their home, and when they did not,
the court finds them unworthy. The E.s explained that they needed
work commitment must be defined to accommodate continuing child-care responsibilities."
(footnote omitted)).
139. The E.s were hoping to adopt D.S. outright, which did not occur. In re D.S., 600
A.2d 71, 73-74 (D.C. 1991) (ordering the trial court to consolidate V.V.'s and the E.s' compet-
ing adoption petitions on remand). Similarly, the Skeens, hoping to have Debra's son
adopted, instead were enjoined from proceeding with the adoption and were ordered to pay
certain court and medical costs. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 823-24, 828-29 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984) (upholding the lower court's award of custody to the biological parents,
Debra and Jeffrey, as well as the lower court's order that the Skeens pay certain expenses).
140. Sheens, 480 A.2d 820.
141. The fact that T.S. did not get along well with the E.s is documented in the testimony
of a social worker and of the E.s themselves. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 76-77. The court also
notes that the E.s did not want to adopt D.S. at the time of her birth. Id at 77-78, 79.
Much of the blame for the E.s' failure is placed on Mrs. E. The fact that T.S. had emotional
problems, including prostitution and running away from home, is blamed, in part, on the fact
that not only did Mrs. E. not believe that T.S. had been raped by her natural father, but she
also sent T.S. to live with him later on. Id at 77 n.1 1, 78-79 n.12. The court notes testimony
that Mrs. E. refused therapy, did not appear to understand the reality of her situation with
T.S. and D.S., and contributed no financial support through social service agencies. Id at 77-
79.
142. See In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 75 (quoting from the motion filed by D.S.'s guardian ad
litem to terminate T.S.'s parental rights, which states the fact that the "E.s expressed interest
in caring for D.S., but not on a permanent basis"); id. at 78 (quoting Mr. E.'s admission that
the E. family was in crisis and thus could not take D.S.); id at 79 (quoting Mrs. E. about T.S.'s
problems and the E. family's own problems); id. at 79 n.12 (quoting the E.s as saying that
T.S.'s story of sexual abuse was like that of someone "crying wolf").
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to attend to other family problems at the time and could not manage
integrating a new baby into their family.' 43 I think this explanation
would be accepted if offered by white grandparents.
The kinship care expected by the court has been described in nu-
merous scholarly works which document (in either positive or nega-
tive light) how African-American grandmothers head up their
families and keep their kin together. 144 What the court seems to be
doing is to essentialize these studies with the claim that, if many
black grandmothers do this, then all black grandmothers must. In
addition, the black "mammy"' 45 image has not disappeared from
the American ideological lexicon. So it is more difficult for those
holding the image to imagine an African-American grandmother not
wanting her grandchild, whatever her reasons, than it is to imagine a
white grandmother not wanting her grandchild.
4. The Confluence of Gender, Race, and Class: The Parents
A. The Non-residential Parents
Like the grandparents, the parents are viewed by the court in
terms of gender and race ideologies. For example, an issue which
seems to be a gender issue, but which cannot be adequately ex-
plained by gender theories alone, is the contradictory treatment ac-
corded the two non-residential biological parents, T.S. and Jeffrey.
Neither one provided a home for the baby or appeared to want to
play an important role in the baby's home.146 Neither one appears
to have changed the course of his or her life to commit to, or even
143. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 78-79 (D.C. 1991).
144. In a study conducted by Carol Stack of kinship patterns of African-American families
living in a Chicago housing project, she found that a teenage mother frequently does not raise
her child. Rather, her mother will raise the child if the teenager is not considered mature
enough to do so. STAcK, supra note 78, at 47-48 (describing the story of one teenage mother
who left her child with her mother for six years; when she returned to reclaim the child, her
mother refused to relinquish the child). Stack also found that as many as one-third of the
children in the project were living with extended kin. STACK, supra note 78, at 69.
Furthermore, Elmer andJoanne Martin found in their study of the extended African-Ameri-
can family that the dominant figure in extended families is most often a grandmother. ELiER
P. MARTIN &JOANNE MrrcHELL MARTiN, THE BLAcK ETENDED FAMILY 17-21 (1978) (noting
that in several of the families they studied, a family member took advantage of the grand-
mother's goodness by sending their child to live with the grandmother).
145. See Roberts, supra note 78 (describing the development of the "mammy" image in
U.S. history).
146. T.S. took D.S. to live with her at V.V.'s house when D.S. was eight days old, and in
this respect provided her with a physical home. However, T.S. left V.Vs home soon after,
effectively giving up any role that she would assume in D.S.'s psychological home. In re D.S.,
600 A.2d at 74. Jeffrey obtained custody at trial, providing a physical home for Michael with
Jeffrey or the Paternos,Jeffrey's parents. HoweverJeffrey's service with the U.S. Navy meant
he would have no role in providing care for the baby. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822-
23, 826-27 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
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accommodate, parenthood. 147 If their parents, or a parental figure
such as V.V., had not stepped forward to establish a relationship
with the baby, it is likely that both parents would have disappeared
from the lives of the children, both functionally and legally. 148
Nonetheless, Jeffrey's parental rights are never in serious dispute.
In fact, although it appears that he never intended to provide daily
care for the child, he is accorded the power to stop Debra's adop-
tion plans. Furthermore, he is awarded substantial visitation
rights. 149 T.S., on the other hand, stands to have her parental rights
terminated. 50
An apparently significant distinction between Jeffrey and T.S. is
that T.S. was charged with neglect of D.S. two days after her
birth,' 5 1 while no such charge was ever brought against Jeffrey. In
my view, however, the distinction is more one of class and extended
family circumstances than of reality as it is experienced by the baby.
From the baby's perspective, it does not matter if T.S. had a history
of emotional problems, substance abuse, and absences from govern-
ment-run group homes, 5 2 or thatJeffrey was required by his job to
be away.153 From the baby's perspective, what matters is that he or
she is being cared for, and neither T.S. nor Jeffrey was doing that.
Jeffrey was in a position to provide biologically-related substitute
caregivers, 54 while T.S. was not.'55 This is a difference which is not
of their making, but which arises instead out of the situations of
147. T.S. appears to have little interest in her child. Consider that she left D.S. with V.V.
while D.S. was still a newborn. T.S. visited her child at V.V.'s until March 1987, when D.S.
was approximately nine. months old. At this time, T.S. ceased visits with D.S. altogether until
a visit in March 1988, due to her placement in a Florida drug treatment center. Between that
date and the date of the hearing terminating her parental rights, T.S. visited D.S. only once, in
January 1989. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74-75, 77. As forJeffrey, he neither quits his career in
the Navy, nor appears to have offered to take the child with him on his Navy tours or to ask for
a compassionate reassignment. Skeens, 480 A.2d at 823-24.
148. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 75 (D.C. 1991); Skeens, 480 A.2d at 823-24.
149. Skeens, 480 A.2d at 823 (quoting the lower court's award to Jeffrey of visitation at
least two nights per week, alternating major holidays, and six consecutive weeks during the
summer).
150. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 73-74 (ordering the lower court to consider on remand the
termination of T.S.'s parental rights when addressing the consolidated and competing adop-
tion petitions of V.V. and the E.s).
151. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 74.
152. Id.
153. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
154. Jeffrey preferred that Michael, instead of being adopted, be placed in Jeffrey's cus-
tody, with care being given by his sister and her husband or by his parents. Skeens v. Paterno,
No. 94, slip op. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983).
155. For example, at one point during the trial, T.S.'s social worker testified that she had
asked the E.s to take D.S. after her birth but that they refused this request. In re D.S., 600
A.2d 71, 77 (D.C. 1991). Another social worker who worked at the hospital where D.S. was
born made the same request, and was also refused. Id at 78. Both Mr. and Mrs. E. similarly
testified. Id at 78-79.
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their extended families: Jeffrey had siblings and parents able to take
custody of the baby. Further, Michael did not need to have a guard-
ian appointed for him, since his mother was available to consent to
medical care. D.S., on the other hand, did need to have a guardian
appointed, since neither her father nor her mother was available to
give consent as needed. The different legal situations would pro-
duce different results: a neglect action had to be brought in the case
of D.S. so that a person other than her mother could be named
guardian. Because Michael had his mother available, no suc' tion
was needed in his case. Again, this is a difference that is not crcated
by Jeffrey and T.S.; it has to do with the other people surrounding
the baby. If D.S. had had a father available to act as guardian,just as
Michael had a mother available, the neglect action would not have
been needed.
Finally, the economic circumstances in which Jeffrey and T.S.
found themselves may have had an impact on whether a neglect ac-
tion was brought: Jeffrey came from a monied family, while T.S. did
not.1 56 Statistically, poorer families are more likely to come to the
attention of protective service agencies and to be the subject of ne-
glect actions. 57 The ability of their parents to earn money obvi-
ously is not something that accurately distinguishes between Jeffrey
and T.S. in terms of their parenting abilities.
The only distinction between Jeffrey and T.S. that is relevant to
the well-being of the babies is their willingness and ability to care
for them. In these characteristics, T.S. and Jeffrey are identical:
neither appeared willing or able to change his/her life or lifestyle to
accommodate parenthood.158 Nonetheless, Jeffrey was accorded an
opportunity to seek custody and awarded extensive visitation with
the baby to be exercised by his parents; 59 T.S.'s parental rights
156. Consider that Jeffrey's parents paid a prominent Baltimore law firm to handle his
case, .upra note 90, while the E. family could not afford private counsel and instead had a
court-appointed attorney. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 75 n.5 (noting that the E.s were appointed
counsel when D.S. was only five days old).
157. SeeJudith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child.. A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect andAbtue Cases, 63 GEo. LJ. 887-89, 894-96, 903-04, 910-12, 917 (1975) (assert-
ing that the current neglect laws are derived from Elizabethan poor laws, which often assisted
the poor by separating them from their children and sending the children away to work).
Areen states that the most common characteristic of parents charged with neglect is poverty,
despite the fact that child neglect is found at all income levels. Id. This fact raises the possi-
bility that class bias is significant in determining whether a child is neglected. Id.
158. See supra note 147 (discussing the lack of interest that both T.S. andJeffrey appeared
to have for their respective children).
159. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 823 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (quoting the lower
court's holding thatJeffrey could exercise his visitation through his parents while he was on
naval duty); id. at 826-27 (holding that allowing the Paternos visitation rights in Jeffrey's stead
was an important way for him to maintain contact with his child).
19931
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
were vulnerable to termination' 60 despite the later willingness of
her mother and stepfather to adopt the baby. 161
In my view, the different treatment is more a product of gender,
race, and class differences between Jeffrey and T.S. than a product
of functional differences between them as parents. From the per-
spective of the court, Jeffrey looks like a good parent not because he
will be caring for the child but because he is willing to find someone
to care for the child. While willingness would not be sufficient to
demonstrate that a woman will be a good mother, it is sufficient for
a man, because, as I have discussed in another article, volunteering
is what men "should" do as parents.1 62 They may not be drafted
into parenthood, but they must be praised for volunteering for
duty. 16 3 T.S., of course, fails as a mother because she is not willing
to care for the child herself, even though she has recruited her par-
ents to stand in for her. As a woman-draftee, she must do the job,
not delegate it. Race and class sharpen the distinctions between
Jeffrey and T.S. because the ideology that a white man will be fully
committed to paid work and, therefore, have no time for child-
care'6 4 stands in sharp contrast to the ideological stance that an Af-
rican-American woman can experience happiness as a welfare
drone. 165
B. Childrearing and Parental Employment
Another set of gender ideologies is exposed when one compares
Jeffrey and Debra. Jeffrey is seeking custody and/or visitation, but
he intends to have his sister and her husband or, in the alternative,
his parents, care for the baby while he is in the Navy.166 Debra is
seeking custody and would care for the child herself. In the second
160. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 75 (D.C. 1991) (noting that the lower court reduced T.S.'s
visitation following two consecutive scheduled visits where T.S. did not keep the appoint-
ment); i& at 89 (ordering the lower court to consider on remand the termination of T.S.'s
parental rights).
161. Nearly three years after D.S.'s birth, the E.s filed a petition in D.C. Superior Court to
adopt D.S. In re D.S., 600 A.2d at 75. The E.s obtained T.S.'s relinquishment of her parental
rights to them. Id.
162. Czapanskiy, supra note 9.
163. Czapanskiy, supra note 9.
164. Williams, supra note 9.
165. See Nell Irvin Painter, Hil Thomas, and the Use of Radal Stereotyping, in RAcE-ING Jus-
TicE, EN-GENDERING POWER 200, 210 (Toni Morrison, ed., 1992) ("Mammy andJezebel and
the welfare queen may be the most prominent roles for black women in American culture, but
even these figures, as limited as is their range, inhabit the shadows of American
imagination.").
166. See Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23, 1983) (stating
as a fact thatJeffrey "preferred that the child be placed in his custody with the understanding
that Michael's care be committed to Jeffrey's sister and her husband ... until such time as a
final determination was made regarding Michael's status.").
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appellate decision, in which the award of custody to Debra and visi-
tation to Jeffrey via his parents were upheld, both of these facts are
reported as if they were inevitable and obvious. 167 Nobody ques-
tions or even seems curious about why Jeffrey's attachment to the
Navy is an absolute or whether he could not take care for his son
while in the Navy. In the early 1980s, there were many single par-
ents in the armed services.168 It seems likely, however, that it did
not occur to anyone that Jeffrey should leave the service or seek a
compassionate reassignment,1 69 because it is not part of the stere-
otypical role of fatherhood to reduce one's employment to perform
parenting duties. 70 Indeed, it is more a part of stereotypical father-
hood to increase one's commitment to employment and seek to earn
more money, even at the expense of time caring for one's
children.17 1
At the same time Jeffrey's employment status is discussed, the ap-
pellate decisions in Skeens make no mention of whether Debra is em-
ployed, in school, or engaged in any activity other than being
available to care for the baby.' 72 While it is still more likely in two-
167. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820, 822-23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
168. See Kathy Sawyer, Miitaris Single Parents, WAsH. Posr, June 21, 1982, at Al ("The
Army, for example, has 27,000 single parents among enlisted personnel and officers, more
than five-sixths of them fathers."); Molly Moore, Single Parents Struggle in the Military, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 3, 1986, at Al, A4 (stating that the "single parent population in the Navy has
exploded from 5,100 in 1980 to an estimated 25,000 in 1986 and that 80 percent of the single
sailors with children are men.").
169. Moore, supra note 168, at AS. In the Army, the Compassionate Review Branch han-
dles requests for transfers from parents and other military personnel with personal problems.
However, "[c]hild care difficulties are not on the list of automatically acceptable reasons for
granting transfers." Moore, supra note 168, at A5. Transfers based on child care difficulties
are more difficult in the Navy because of the sea duty requirement. Moore, supra note 168, at
AS.
170. See Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1455 n.146 (indicating that in a survey, 41 percent of
the men said that "men should not take off any time" to care for newborns (citing Cindy
Skrzycki, More Men Taking the Daddy Track, WAsH. Posr, Nov. 6, 1990, at Cl), and noting that
because of employer and peer pressure against its use by men, most men do not take parent-
ing leave (Carol Lawson, Baby Beckons: Why is Daddy at Work?, N.Y. TINMES, May 16, 1991, at
Cl));see also Boyd, supra note 117, at 177 ("[u]nder traditional familial ideologies, the father is
expected to provide financial support to the family and the mother is expected to render
services in the home, including child care.... In this way judges reinforce expectations of
genderjob segregation within and outside the home."); Polikoff, supra note 9, at 239 ("a man
with a full-timejob who provides any assistance in childrearing, however limited, looks like a
dedicated father, while a woman with a full-time job who still does primary, but not all, care-
taking, looks like 'half' a mother, dissatisfied with the childrearing role.").
171. See Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1451-57, 1435 (discussing the impact of unequal allo-
cation of household labor in families with two working parents and noting that women still do
far more child care and housework while employers expect men to focus more on theirjobs).
"The average father living with his child spends less than ten minutes a day caring for his
child, while the average mother spends several hours." Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1435
(footnote omitted).
172. Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820,826-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (findingJeffrey's
naval duty an exceptional circumstance for awarding visitation rights through the Paternos,
while Debra is only referred to as a minor).
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parent families for mothers rather than fathers to forego wage work
to stay home and care for the children, the percentage of single
mothers who do so is, and has been, relatively small.17" It may also
be true that assumptions about class combined with gender stereo-
types led the judges to assume that Debra should remain at home
with the child. As the judges knew, Debra's father, who was both a
lawyer and a party in the case, is a lawyer.17 4 Although there was no
evidence recited in the appellate decisions about Debra's family's
income, the judges may have presumed that Debra was middle-class,
and, like other middle-class mothers, was more "appropriately" at
home with her child than in the world of paid work. 175
In contrast, the D.C. Court of Appeals inquired into the employ-
ment status of V.V., the foster parent who was seeking to adopt
D.S.176 Thejudges indicated that they were satisfied that she was a
good person even though unemployed, because she suffered from a
disability.1 77 One must wonder why her attachment to wage work is
expected while Debra's is not, when they are identically situated as
single caregivers to a very young child. One possible explanation is
that assumptions about race, class, and sex are all at work to lead
judges to conclude that a single African-American mother "be-
longs" in paid labor.178 No similar attention is paid to the employ-
173. See BARBAA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONoMIc EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 25 (1986) (noting
that in 1970, 75.6 percent of divorced women with children under 18 years old participated in
the labor force, and that figure rose to 79.1 percent in 1985). In comparison, 39.9 percent of
married women (with husband present) with children under 18 years old worked outside the
home in 1970, whereas this figure rose to 60.8 percent in 1985. Id
174. See Skeens v. Paterno 480 A.2d 820, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (listing Edward
John Skeens as representing appellant).
175. See CHODOROW, supra note 8, at 65 (suggesting that if the Western middle.class
housewife worked outside the home, "neither she nor the rest of society is apt to consider this
work to be important to her self-definition in the way that her housewife role is.").
176. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71,78 (D.C. 1991) ("V.V. explained that she had not worked for
six years because she had a back injury, that she applied for disability, that her twenty-year-old
daughter lived with her...").
177. Id at 80. The trial court judge found that V.V. "does not have physical and medical
problems and is currently on medications and no longer works. However, [V.V.] has provided
more than adequate care for [T.S.] when she needed it as well as for [D.S.]." Id.
178. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLAss 230-31, 237 (Vintage Books 1983)
(1981) (noting that the majority of Black women have worked outside their homes throughput
this country's history and "have been receiving wages for housework for untold decades.").
"Proportionately, more Black women have always worked outside their homes than have their
white sisters (footnote omitted). The enormous space that work occupies in Black women's
lives today follows a pattern established during the earliest days of slavery." Id. at 1. See also
BERGMANN, supra note 173, at 280 (discussing the emergence of women in the workplace in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, with domestic service being the largest single occupa-
tion open to them). "Black and immigrant women from poverty-stricken families" were most
likely to hold domestic servicejobs. Bergmann, supra note 173, at 18. "In addition, race and
sex discrimination relegated most black women to domesticjobs." Bergmann, supra note 173,
at 280-8 1. See also Roberts, supra note 78, at 19-22 (discussing how after slavery, Black women
continued to work in patterns drastically different from those of white women).
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ment status of Mrs. E., of Debra's mother, or ofJeffrey's mother, all
of whom are married mothers and therefore exempt from the paid
employment requirement because they are allowed to be financially
dependent on their husbands. 7 9
IV. WHAT TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED? AN ARGUMENT FOR A
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
Asking where a decisionmaker might have gone wrong because of
stereotypical thinking about gender, race, or class is only the begin-
ning. The imaginative work of thinking about how a case might turn
out in a bias-free environment is equally challenging. So, what
should have happened to D.S. and Michael, their parents, foster par-
ent, and grandparents? The answers are not entirely dear, but here
are some suggestions and possible criteria for reaching a decision in
such cases.
It seems likely that less bias would work its way into decisions like
these if parenting conduct were evaluated from a functional ap-
proach.'10 Using this approach, the court would focus on what each
potential parent or caregiver has to offer the child in very specific
terms. Looking to the history of the relationship between the party
and the child would make this inquiry even more fruitful.181 The
179. Boyd, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
180. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian.Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 490-91
(1990) (advocating that courts and legislatures focus on two criteria when defining
parenthood: "the legally unrelated adult's performance of parenting functions and the child's
view of that adult as a parent."); Note, Lookingfor a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Func-
tional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1640, 1641 (1991) (noting that
a functional approach to child custody preserves "existing non-nudear relationships" and
"gives individuals greater control over the structure of their family lives."). "Instead offocus-
ing on the identities and formal attributes of the individuals within a relationship, the func-
tional approach inquires whether a relationship shares the essential characteristics of a
traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs." kld at 1646 (footnote
citing cases omitted).
181. See Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1463, 1465 (noting that "[tihe question of whether a
particular change is fair would have to be addressed from the perspective of the child, the
father, and the mother, her role could not be assumed or ignored"). "No longer could it be
assumed that, because of their sex, mothers always and fathers never do particular things that
children need." Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1463. I then suggest that "[1]egal questions
involving parents and children would be evaluated according to whether a particular ap-
proach would promote responsible and altruistic conduct on the part of parents' connections
with their children." Czapanskiy, supra note 9,at 1465 (citing Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expres-
sing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 298-306 (1988)).
See also Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615,
626-30 (1992) (examining how some courts have adopted the gender-neutral primary care-
taker preference). Scott suggests that an" 'approximation' approach can accomplish the con-
ventional purposes of child custody law more effectively than any alternative." Id. at 630.
This approach to child custody focuses "on the past relationship between parents and child
and seeks to approximate as closely as possible the predivorce patterns of parental responsi-
bility." Id
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alternative, as illustrated in the two cases discussed above, is to al-
low ideological stances about what constitutes a good mother or a
good father to influence the court, perhaps to the detriment of the
child.
In the case of D.S., the functional parent was V.V.18 2 V.V. cared
for the child from the time she was born and appears to have done a
goodjob. Under a functional approach, I believe that her successful
parenting history should give her an advantage to keeping the child
in her care. The biological tie between T.S. and D.S. does not
demonstrate that her views on who should raise the child are likely
to better serve the child's needs. At the same time, the E.s were
devoted to the child and might have initially been awarded custody
based on their conduct as involved relatives. They too, therefore,
have demonstrated a parenting history, at least according to the evi-
dence so far. There seems to be no reason to exclude the E.s from
the life of the child except to serve a theory that the person with
custody of the child should also have the power to exclude others
from the life of the child. 183 If the evidence should demonstrate
that the E.s cannot respect V.V.'s approach as a primary parent or
cooperate with her about the needs of D.S., however, the story
could change. 8 4 Absent such evidence, it does not appear that D.S.
would be harmed if V.V. adopted her, so long as the opportunity for
the E.s to maintain their relationship is preserved.
The case of Michael is somewhat different. Once Debra was per-
suaded (or coerced) to give up her plans to permit Michael to be
adopted,18 5 she was willing to undertake his daily care and should
have been awarded custody, as the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals eventually decided. However, since Jeffrey was not willing to
place hiiself in a position to care for Michael, he should not have
been given the same standing to seek custody or even to object to
182. In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 74 (D.C. 1991). After the baby's birth, both the mother
(T.S.) and the baby returned to V.V.'s home. After T.S. left, V.V. "remained the uninter-
rupted custodian of D.S." I,7-
183. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusionary Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L REv. 879, 938839,
962 (1984) (advocating using a nonexclusive parenthood standard in custody disputes and
noting a trend in favor ofgrandparent visitation). A nonexclusive parenthood standard would
prevent the adult with custody from arbitrarily excluding others from the child's life and allow
the child to maintain relationships with adultsoutside the nuclear family. Id. at 962.
184. Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1477 (according the "right to object only to those par-
ents who had acted as parents."). "The test would be whether a person had participated to
the fullest extent of his or her capacities in the rearing of the child in a way which is mutually
supportive of the child's other parent." Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at 1477.
185. Debra and her parents sued for custody of Michael in response to Jeffrey's Petition
for Immediate Custody. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94, slip op. at 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 23,
1983). "Debra vigorously opposed Jeff's adoption of Michael, alleging his unfitness to as-
sume such a role." I.
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the adoption under a functional approach. The fact that his parents
or his sister and brother-in-law were willing to take custody when he
was not should not give Jeffrey the same standing as Debra to seek
custody. The birth mother should not be forced to choose between
caring for the baby herself or giving the baby to custodians not of
her choice when the birth father is not himself willing to be a func-
tional parent to his child.
My position regarding Michael's case is an individualistic stance
that seems incongruent with the notion that D.S. is well-served by
requiring V.V. to permit the E.s to continue their relationship with
her. How can I favor a relationship orientation in the case involving
D.S. and an individualistic orientation in the case involving Michael?
I feel comfortable with the apparent contradiction because I think
there is a difference between deciding about the adoption or cus-
tody of an infant and deciding about the adoption or custody of an
older child.186 The difference is one of participation and history:
when an adult has gone to the emotional, physical, and financial ef-
fort of becoming a reliable caregiver in a child's life, that history
cannot be ignored from either the child's or the adult's perspective.
At the time of a child's birth, there is no history of caregiving; there
are only promises and predictions. If d birth mother forgoes placing
a child for adoption and decides to care for the child herself, she is
promising to become the caregiver the child needs and to make the
sacrifices necessary to carry out that promise. If a birth father ob-
jects to placing the child for adoption, but is unwilling to make the
same promise and sacrifice, it seems unfair to give him the power to
force the birth mother to do the same.
In the situation where the paternal grandparents are, in effect,
willing to substitute themselves for the parent as caregiver, as in the
case of the Paternos, the question regarding custody or adoption is
a closer one. The question becomes an issue as to whether, because
of their blood relationship to the infant, their promise should be
privileged over the promise being offered by proposed adoptive
parents. I think that the birth mother should be authorized to reject
the offer of the paternal grandparents. The reason is that the
mother has already made a sacrifice on behalf of the infant by shar-
ing her body and risking her health to bring the pregnancy to term.
Therefore, if she is not persuaded that the grandparents' offer is
preferable for her and the infant, she should be allowed to go for-
186. Michael was born onJan. 21, 1983, and would have been nineteen months old when
the appeal was decided. D.S.'s termination hearing took place when she was forty months old.
In re D.S., 600 A.2d 71, 76 (D.C. 1991).
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ward with the adoption. Otherwise, her autonomy is sacrificed in
the service of a blood relationship which holds only a promise and
not a history.18 7
I am somewhat uncomfortable taking this stance because I am
aware that informal kinship adoptions are more common in commu-
nities of people of color than in communities of Euro-Americans. 88
I have little direct experience with kinship adoptions, although I
have done some lawyering involving families where such adoptions
have occurred. In the course of this lawyering, I have been moved
by the emotional investment that paternal grandparents have shown
in grandchildren they have never met, but whom they are unwilling
to let go to adoptive parents chosen by the mother. The loss and
grieving of these grandparents it seems to me, is just as palpable as
the grief of a young woman who gives up her childhood to raise a
baby, or who gives up her baby with some degree of unwillingness.
Nonetheless, it appears that kinship adoptions in communities of
people of color usually are begun with the consent and approval of
the mother. Therefore, there is often no issue that the mother's ini-
tial placement of the child with kin for adoption, whether maternal
or paternal, was the product of the mother being persuaded that this
was best for her and the baby at the time.
The Paternos offered no such power, nor respected any such au-
thority in Debra to decide what was best beforejeffrey sued. Jeffrey,
with the support and encouragement of his parents, sued before the
baby was a week old. 189 Due to the timing of the suit, no substantial
discussions could have taken place in an effort to persuade Debra
that Michael would be better off in the care of his father's family.
The litigation was protracted and bitter; it was a fight, not a respect-
ful resolution. I cannot condone the paternal grandparents' exer-
tion of power via their son over a mother who voluntarily bears a
child. To exert this power by filing suit is to ignore the reality that
pregnancy is not entirely safe or painless. It is a sacrifice, and the
person making the sacrifice should largely control the outcome.
On the other hand, I think that a birth mother's autonomy has far
less importance when the issue is allowing adults with a history of
care and commitment to a child to continue having a relationship
187. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 114, at 1561-72 (arguing that the ideology of
American society-comprising autonomous individuals with rights--is gender-biased, be-
cause society perceives women who pursue their own self-interest, e.g., careers or education,
over their children's needs as selfish).
188. See supra notes 78, 79 and accompanying text.
189. Skeens v. Paterno, No. 94, slip op. at 1-2 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. May 23, 1983) (noting
that Michael was born on Jan. 21, 1983, and thatJeff instituted a "Petition For Immediate
Custody" onjan. 24, 1983).
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with that child. Accordingly, I am not troubled by requiring V.V. or
Debra to permit the grandparents to have visitation with D.S. and
Michael. The only caveat should be that the grandparents act with
respect toward the caregiving parent when it comes to scheduling
visits, not criticizing or interfering with parenting decisions, and so
on. The autonomy of the caregiver is earned through emotional,
physical, and financial energy, and it is entitled to respectful regard
and treatment from all those involved in the child's life.
Considering the role of grandparents in the complex issues of
custody, adoption, and care of children is an important issue in
modern America. Because of economics, more children are in fami-
lies where both parents work outside the home or where a single
parent supports the household.190 Illness and substance abuse have
left some parents incapable of caring for their children. The need of
children to have adults in their lives who care about them and for
them can only be on the increase. Sometimes, connections with
grandparents and other caring adults, such as V.V., can benefit a
child regardless of the level of attention his or her parents can pro-
vide. Whether the law legitimately can be involved in these relation-
ships may turn on whetherjudges can set aside their preconceptions
about who is a "good" man or woman, who is a "good" father or
mother, and who is a "good" set of grandparents to be involved
with a child. Instead, we should be asking who has done the job.
The functioning of children and the adults who care for them
should be our focus and our test in determining custody, adoption,
and visitation rights.
190. SeeJames R. Wetzel, American families: 75 years of change, MONTHLY LABOR Rnv., Mar.
1990, at 4, 10 (fig. 4) (noting that single-person households in the United States rose from 13
percent in 1960 to 24.1 percent in 1988); Howard V. Hayghe, Family members in the work force,
MONTHLY LABOR RIV., Mar. 1990, at 14, 14, 17 (noting that in 1975, "53 percent of the mar-
ried-couple families with children consisted of traditional families, while 43 percent fell into
the dual-worker category; by 1988, the proportions were 33 percent and 63 percent."). In
addition, divorce and separation have increased the number of families headed by single wo-
men and men. Id at 14. By 1988, about 14 percent of families were headed by a single
parent. Id. at 18.
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